30 research outputs found
The Sample Complexity of Auctions with Side Information
Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been
considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is
individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a
reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories,
but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a
continuum. For example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their
annual income, their propensity to buy an item based on past behavior, or in
the case of ad auctions, the click through rate of their ads. We introduce an
alternate model that captures this aspect, where bidders are a priori
identical, but can be distinguished based (only) on some side information the
auctioneer obtains at the time of the auction. We extend the sample complexity
approach of Dhangwatnotai et al. and Cole and Roughgarden to this model and
obtain almost matching upper and lower bounds. As an aside, we obtain a revenue
monotonicity lemma which may be of independent interest. We also show how to
use Empirical Risk Minimization techniques to improve the sample complexity
bound of Cole and Roughgarden for the non-identical but independent value
distribution case.Comment: A version of this paper appeared in STOC 201
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for
sale. A buyer's valuation for units of the item is ,
where the per unit valuation and the capacity are private information
of the buyer. We consider this problem in the Bayesian setting, where the pair
is drawn jointly from a given probability distribution. In the
\emph{unlimited supply} setting, the optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism is
a pricing problem, i.e., it is a menu of lotteries. In this paper we show that
under a natural regularity condition on the probability distributions, which we
call \emph{decreasing marginal revenue}, the optimal pricing is in fact
\emph{deterministic}. It is a price curve, offering units of the item for a
price of , for every integer . Further, we show that the revenue as a
function of the prices is a \emph{concave} function, which implies that
the optimum price curve can be found in polynomial time. This gives a rare
example of a natural multi-parameter setting where we can show such a clean
characterization of the optimal mechanism. We also give a more detailed
characterization of the optimal prices for the case where there are only two
possible demands
Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel
We initiate the study of parallel algorithms for fairly allocating
indivisible goods among agents with additive preferences. We give fast parallel
algorithms for various fundamental problems, such as finding a Pareto Optimal
and EF1 allocation under restricted additive valuations, finding an EF1
allocation for up to three agents, and finding an envy-free allocation with
subsidies. On the flip side, we show that fast parallel algorithms are unlikely
to exist (formally, -hard) for the problem of computing Round-Robin EF1
allocations
On the Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants
to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at
some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the
two items is known, and the agent knows the valuation for the current item (but
not for the one in the future). The designer seeks to maximize expected
revenue, and the auction must be deterministic, truthful, and ex post
individually rational. The optimum mechanism involves a protocol whereby the
seller elicits the buyer's current valuation, and based on the bid makes two
take-it-or-leave-it offers, one for now and one for the future. We show that
finding the optimum deterministic mechanism in this situation - arguably the
simplest meaningful dynamic mechanism design problem imaginable - is NP-hard.
We also prove several positive results, among them a polynomial linear
programming-based algorithm for the optimum randomized auction (even for many
bidders and periods), and we show strong separations in revenue between
non-adaptive, adaptive, and randomized auctions, even when the valuations in
the two periods are uncorrelated. Finally, for the same problem in an
environment in which contracts cannot be enforced, and thus perfection of
equilibrium is necessary, we show that the optimum randomized mechanism
requires multiple rounds of cheap talk-like interactions
Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence
We consider a game of persuasion with evidence between a sender and a
receiver. The sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the
information, the sender wishes to persuade the receiver to take a single action
(e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The sender's utility
depends solely on whether or not the receiver takes the action. The receiver's
utility depends on both the action as well as the sender's private information.
We study three natural variations. First, we consider sequential equilibria of
the game without commitment power. Second, we consider a persuasion variant,
where the sender commits to a signaling scheme and then the receiver, after
seeing the evidence, takes the action or not. Third, we study a delegation
variant, where the receiver first commits to taking the action if being
presented certain evidence, and then the sender presents evidence to maximize
the probability the action is taken. We study these variants through the
computational lens, and give hardness results, optimal approximation
algorithms, as well as polynomial-time algorithms for special cases. Among our
results is an approximation algorithm that rounds a semidefinite program that
might be of independent interest, since, to the best of our knowledge, it is
the first such approximation algorithm for a natural problem in algorithmic
economics.Comment: 31 page